Second price auctions with reserve price are widely used by the main Internet actors because of their incentive compatibility property. We show that once reserve price are learned based on past bidder behavior, this auction is not anymore incentive compatible. Through a functional analytic rather than game theoretic approach, we exhibit shading strategies which lead to large increase of revenue for the bidders. In the symmetric case, we show that there exists a simple equilibrium strategy that enables bidders to get the revenue they would get in a second price auction without reserve price. We then study the consequences of this result on recent work on collusion in second price auctions and prove that the proposed bidding strategies are robust to some approximation error of the auctioneer.
Introduction
Billions of auctions are run worldwide everyday. One of the main supplier of such auctions is the online advertising market [1, 2, 3] . Ad slots are sold to advertisers by a publisher, typically a web site, following more or less explicit mechanisms, i.e., a type of auctions with specific rules. Those auctions take place on platforms known as "ad exchanges" [4] .
Maybe the most common types of auctions used in this setting are the classical second price auctions with reserve prices as they are reputed to be truthful (it is dominant for buyers to bid their true valuation) and even optimal for identical bidders [5, 6] .
However, one of the crucial working assumption is that the seller must know the distribution of valuations of the bidders to tune optimally her mechanism. In most real life applications, such as online advertising, auctions between a single publisher and the same advertisers are not run only once, but several billion times each day. As a consequence, the seller has access to an incredibly large amount of bids from each bidder for more or less equivalent goods. So one trend of research is to learn the optimal mechanisms from the past sequence of bids, assuming that they truthfully represent the valuations of the bidders [7, 8, 9] .
The classical reasoning [1, 10] behind this traditional assumption is that the seller is only choosing incentive compatible auctions such as Vickrey auctions. Therefore, since in a one shot second price auction it is optimal to bid one's own valuations, the seller can safely expect to observe the past valuations of the buyer, and hence an approximation of her distribution of valuations.
However, if the seller uses data acquired on past auctions (as explicitly mentioned in [11] ) to update the mechanism (e.g. compute the monopoly price on the last 24 hours of data), it is clear that the bidders could have an incentive to shade their bids as mentioned in [12, 11] . By bidding untruthfully, the bidder might lower drastically her reserve price, at a small cost of lost auctions.
We are not aware of work that has clearly exhibited which strategies should be used by bidders once they understand that bidding truthfully is not anymore a dominant strategy when the seller computes the reserve price on their former bids. The goal of the paper is to address this gap in the literature, to prove that second price auction with reserve price are no longer truthful when the arXiv:1808.06979v2 [cs.GT] 25 Mar 2019 seller is setting the reserve price based on former bids of the buyer and to provide simple strategies for bidders to dramatically increase their profit when they are facing dynamic reserve prices. Our new insights also help upend some recent results on the impact of collusion in second price auctions.
Setting
Following [11] , in the ad exchange context, it is reasonable to assume that there are enough samples such that the difference between the sample (i.e. observed) distribution and the true (i.e. population) distribution is negligible. This is why we do not consider through most of the paper the sampling error that could happen in the learning of the seller.
We model the process happening in most ad platforms as a two-stage game. During the first stage (for instance, a stage could correspond to a day), the seller receives billions of bids from the different participants on her platform. She assumes they bid truthfully and hence she has access to their respective exact value distributions. During the second stage of the game, she sets for each bidder their reserve price as the exact monopoly price (see [13] and below) computed on the bids she received during the first stage.
The goal of the paper is to show that in this setting of second price auctions with reserve price (i) the bidders should not bid truthfully during the first stage of the game (ii) exhibit optimal or much improved strategies at symmetric equilibrium and when only one bidder is strategic for these auctions (iii) disprove a recent argument that collusion would have negative impact on buyer's revenue. We do so by using a novel approach, which is functional analytic. The strategies we propose yield massive improvement in buyers' revenue, and sometime at no cost to the seller. Those strategies are also simple to compute and implement in practice.
Related work
Revenue maximizing auctions with reserve prices Starting with the seminal work of Myerson [5] , a very rich line of work shows which type of auctions are revenue-maximizing for the seller. [5] proved that in the case of symmetric bidders the revenue maximizing auction is the second price auction with a reserve price equal to the monopoly price. However, in most applications as mentioned in [10] , the symmetric assumption is not satisfied. In the asymmetric case, the Myerson auction is optimal [5] but is difficult to implement in practice [14] since the virtual value is computationally hard to estimate based on former bids of the buyers. The authors of [15, 16, 8] focused on finding approximation of the Myerson auction that keeps a large fraction of the revenue for the seller and that are easy to compute in practice.
Incentive compatibility Even if some papers [1, 10] are still assuming the incentive compatibility of auctions where the reserve price is set per bidders, a new line of work has started investigating if it could be in the bidders' interest to shade their bids [12, 11] . The authors of [11] proposed a method to detect in practice when the mechanism that bidders are facing is not incentive compatible anymore. In [17] , an involved mechanism was designed that keeps the incentive compatibility property even if the seller is learning on former bids of the bidders.
Optimal Bidding strategies. Our paper is also related to papers that tried to optimize bidding strategies when bidders are facing dynamic reserve prices. Most of the literature has focused on the setting of repeated posted price auction [18, 19] where only one bidder is facing a seller who defines dynamically a reserve price.
Notations and key reminders
We consider K independent bidders with value distributions F 1 , . . . , F K . Bidder i draws their value X i i.i.d. according to F i . We identify the distribution F with its cumulative distribution function (cdf) and use both terms exchangeably. Unless otherwise noted, we assume that F has a density (pdf) denoted f . If bidder i uses the shading function β, s/he bids B i = β(X i ) where his/her value is X i . Unless otherwise noted, β is assumed to be increasing throughout the paper.
Reminders If bidder i is using an increasing shading function β i and facing a reserve price r, we define the reserve value x 0 as x 0 = min(x ∈ R|β i (x) ≥ r). Another quantity of interest in auction studies, which depends only on the distribution of a r.v. X with distribution F , is the virtual value of a bidder
and the related hazard rate λ X (x) = f (x) 1−F (x) . In second price and Myerson auctions the reserve price is often set to ψ −1 X (0) [13] , for instance when ψ X is increasing. The value ψ −1 X (0) is called the monopoly price. When ψ X is increasing, X is said to have a regular distribution.
When studying second price auctions, we focus on so-called "lazy" second price auctions [20] , where the item is attributed to the highest bidder, if s/he clears his/her reserve price, and not attributed otherwise. We also assume, as is common practice [11] , that sellers set their reserve prices by maximizing their revenue bidder-per-bidder.
Key ideas

Key ODE
The virtual value function ψ plays a central role in our paper. We begin by investigating the impact of shading one's bid on the virtual value of the bids.
where γ is increasing and differentiable and X 1 is a random variable with cdf F 1 and pdf f 1 . We denote by ψ B the virtual value of the random variable B. If b = γ(x 1 ), we have
Call for some x 0 and a function h
.
Interpretation The previous result gives an explicit way for bidder 1 to shade her bid in such a way that her virtualized bid, i.e. ψ B (b), be any function h(x 1 ) of her value x 1 she chooses: she can, for instance, use γ h (x) for some x 0 of her choosing.
Example In the case of an affine shading, i.e. B = aX + c, we have ψ B (ax + c) = aψ X (x) + c. Taking c = 0 gives the simple but useful results for linear shading that ψ B (ax) = aψ X (x). In particular, when ψ X is regular, linear shading does not change the reserve value.
Directional derivatives
We now turn to computing directional derivatives for the revenue of the bidder in second price auctions. These in turns will yield equilibrium strategies, improved bidding strategies in the onestrategic-bidder setting, extremely simple proofs of the loss of incentive compatibility, among other things. Our functional analytic approach has the great advantage of yielding explicit and constructive strategies to improve the bidders' revenue. Our results hold in very general settings, far away from the symmetric case. In particular, bidders can have different strategies, and value distributions.
We call G the cdf of the maximum of the other players' bids and g the associated pdf. Since we consider the case of lazy second price auctions, the revenue of buyer i is, if B = β(X i ),
See Appendix 9.1 or for instance [13] Equation (5.9) for characterization of the buyer's payment. We also assume that x β is found by the seller by effectively maximizing his/her revenue from this player, i.e. E ψ B (β(X i ))G(β(X i ))1 [β(Xi)≥β(x β )] with respect to β(x β ); since β is increasing, from the buyer's standpoint it is as if the seller was maximizing his/her revenue with respect to x β (in what follows we will therefore write the indicators as 1 [Xi≥x β ] ). We make this assumption because of NP-hardness results for other methods of setting reserve prices [21, 11] .
Lemma 2. Suppose we change β into β t = β + tρ. Both β and β t are assumed to be non-decreasing. Call x β the reserve value corresponding to β, and assume it has the property that ψ B (β(x β )) = 0. Assume it is the unique global maximizer of the revenue of the seller. Then,
See Appendix 9.2 for the proof.
Loss of incentive compatibility If one were bidding truthfully, as conventional economic wisdom would suggest is optimal [13] , we would have in Lemma 2 β(x) = x, and x β f (x β ) − (1 − F (x β )) = 0, by definition of the monopoly price. So we have, if r * is the standard monopoly price, i.e. ψ −1 X (0),
It is clearly not zero for all functions ρ. In particular, it would make sense to take ρ such that −ρ (r * ) is large to increase the reward of the buyer. Bidding truthfully is therefore clearly suboptimal.
Optimal bidding strategies in second price auctions
We detail how the results of the previous section help exhibit strategies that improve the reserve price for buyers and increase dramatically bidders' revenue. We study both the one strategic (i.e. only one player adjusts their bidding strategy) and symmetric equilibrium setting. We show that at symmetric equilibrium, bidders are able to completely remove the effect of the reserve price and reach the revenue they would get in a second price auction without reserve price.
Optimal linear shading strategies in second price auctions in the one strategic case
We can find the optimal linear shading strategy for increasing the bidder revenue by using Lemma 2.
In the case of linear strategies, ρ(x) = x and ρ (x) = 1. β(x) = α * x. As mentioned after Lemma 1, the reserve value is the same with or without linear shading.
After some algebra, we end up the characterization of the optimal linear shading as
(2)
In all players have a uniform[0, 1] value distribution, we get
As K → ∞, α * → 1. We note that
For K = 1, we get α * = 0; for K = 2, we get α * = 7/10. For K = 3, we find α * = 15/17 and α * = 93/98 for K = 4.
We can of course extend this calculation to more complicated parametric strategies (e.g. affine, development on a spline basis..) and compute the optimal strategies in these classes. In the sequel, we show however that there exists a very simple way to see how a bidder can improve her current bidding strategy, with considerable improvement of her revenue at no cost to the seller in a one strategic setting.
A simple way to improve a bidding strategy: thresholding the virtual value
We show here that given a strategy β with non-zero reserve value it is always possible to find another strategy with higher payoff for the bidder where the seller has an incentive to set the reserve price such that the reserve value is equal to zero. Theorem 1. Consider the 1-strategic setting in a second price auction. Suppose β r is a shading function with associated reserve value r > 0. Then we can findβ r such that: 1) The reserve value associated withβ r is 0. 2) Σ(β r ) ≥ Σ(β r ), Σ being the revenue of the seller3) R(β r ) ≥ R(β r ), R being the payoff of the buyer.
The following continuous functions fulfill these conditions for small enough:
Comments: this theorem means that we can always improve a shading function by pushing the reserve value to 0. See Lemma 6 in the Appendix for further results and Appendix 9.3 for a proof. We note furthermore that this shading increases the welfare of the system at no cost to the seller. There could exist better shading function in the one strategic case which lead to higher payoff for the bidder. However, they would depend on a precise estimation of the value distribution of the competition, a hard task in practice. Moreover, a more involved or optimal shading function would be based on the existence of multiple local optima for the seller revenue. In order to understand the existence of all the local optima, the seller would have to look at her revenue for all possible values of the reserve price, which is not guaranteed in practice and requires a global optimization. However, if the seller only optimizes the reserve price locally, with our bidding strategies presented above, she has an incentive to decrease it at each step of the optimization. The class of shading function we propose is easy to implement and lead to dramatic increase of revenue for the bidder, as demonstrated below.
Derivation of symmetric equilibrium in a large class of bidding strategies:
getting the same payoff as if there were no reserve price
We now state a directional derivative result in the class of strategies described above. It implies that the only strategies with 0 "gradient" in this class are strategies that are truthful beyond a value r, where r can be determined through a simple non-linear equation. Details are in Appendix 9.3.
Lemma 3. Suppose r and β are given and such that ψ B (β(r)) > 0. Call R(β; r) the revenue of the bidder using the strategy
and assuming that the seller is welfare-benevolent. In other words, he sells provided there is no downside to him. Then if β t = β + tρ, and R(β; r) denotes buyer revenue,
Also,
1st order conditions We see that the only strategy β and threshold r for which we can cancel the derivatives in all directions ρ consists in bidding truthfully beyond r, where r satisfies the equation
Symmetric case Elementary and standard computations (akin to many performed in [13] ) show that
Hence, the first order conditions for r in the symmetric case are, if K is the total number of players:
Equations (4) and (3) are of course key for our understanding of the problem.
Theorem 2. Suppose we are in a symmetric situation and all buyers use the symmetric optimal strategy described above.
Then the revenue of the seller is the same as in a second price auction with no reserve price. The same is true of the revenue of the buyers.
Interestingly, the theorem shows that this shading strategy completely cancels the effect of the reserve price. We are even able to show this symmetric optimal strategy represents the unique symmetric equilibrium in the class of shading functions defined in Lemma 3. Theorem 3. We consider the symmetric case and assume that bidders have a compactly supported and regular distribution. We assume for simplicity that the distribution is supported on [0,1].
Suppose this distribution has density that is continuous at 0 and 1 with f (1) = 0.
There is a unique symmetric equilibrium in the class of shading functions defined in Lemma 3. It is found by solving Equation (4) to determine r * and bidding truthfully beyond r * .
The proof is in Appendix 9.3. This result shows the impact of shading on reserve price: with smart shading functions, the bidders can recover the revenue they get when the seller is not optimizing her mechanism to maximize her revenue.
Nevertheless, this equilibrium can be weakly collusive since we restrict ourselves to the class of functions introduced in Lemma 3. It is not obvious that the strategy exhibited in Theorem 3 is an equilibrium in a larger class of functions. However, as mentioned previously, from a practical point of view, there exists no other clear way to increase drastically bidders revenue that is independent from a precise estimation of the competition.
Moreover, as mentioned previously, a more complicated shading strategy would be based on the existence of multiple local optima of the function corresponding to the revenue of the seller depending of the reserve price. If the seller were only optimizing locally, there will not be any guarantee that she would observe another local optimum and change the reserve price. By contrast, our proposed strategies are robust to local optimization of the seller since she has clear incentives to decrease the reserve value. This is why we expect the shading functions introduced in the paper should have many practically good properties and be useful in applications in large-scale bidding systems.
Generalization to standard auctions
We now use the revenue equivalence theorem in order to extend our result to the general class of standard auctions. As in [13] , we define a standard auction as an auction where the winner is the bidder with the highest bid.
Theorem 4. For any standard auction with symmetric bidders, if the seller sets the reserve price as the monopoly price corresponding to the distribution shown by the buyer, there exists a non-trivial strategy β such that if all the bidders are using β, the revenue of the bidders and the seller is exactly the one they would get in the standard auction without reserve price.
Proof. We note β the strategy mentioned in Theorem 3 corresponding to the symmetric equilibrium in the class of functions defined in Lemma 3 for second price auctions. We note F the distribution induced by using β over the value distribution F. We note γ the strategy corresponding to the symmetric equilibrium of the standard auction when all bidders have the value distribution F and the reserve price is not function of the virtual value of the bidders.
To compute the value distribution of the bidders, the seller assume that they bid according to the optimal symmetric equilibrium and use γ −1 to reconstruct their value distribution. He then believes that the distribution is F' and sets the reserve price accordingly. Then, using the revenue equivalence principle, the revenue of the standard auction is the same as the revenue of a second price auction with bidders having distribution F'.
Thus based on Theorem 3, if all bidders use γ • β, the revenue of the bidders and the seller is exactly the one they would get in a standard auction without reserve price. It must be an equilibrium since γ is an equilibrium for the considered standard auction when the reserve price is not a function of the virtual value of the bidder and β is an equilibrium when the auction is the second price auction and the reserve price is function of the virtual value of the bidder.
Numerical experiments
We focus on the setting where all bidders have values distributed according to a uniform distribution Unif[0, 1]. This distribution is commonly used as an example in the auction literature [1, 13] . It also has the advantage that analytic computations can be carried out to confirm experimental results. The experiments can easily be extended to other distributions such as log normal distributions [11] .
In our experiments, the seller runs a lazy second price auction where he sets the reserve price as the monopoly price corresponding to the bid distribution of the different buyers. We compare the performance of the different strategies presented in the paper in terms of revenue of the bidders. Fig. 1 shows results in the setting of one strategic bidder and Fig. 2 details profits reached at symmetric equilibrium in the class of shading strategies described in Section 3. In the two settings, we show as baselines the revenue the bidder would get by bidding truthfully when the seller sets the reserve price to zero (upper bound on the buyer revenue) and the revenue he would get by bidding truthfully when the seller sets the reserve price to her monopoly price (lower bound on the buyer profit).
In the one strategic setting, we detail the revenue obtained by the optimal linear shading strategy, the optimal affine shading strategy and the optimal thresholded strategy as the number of bidders changes. We limit the plots to 4 opponents since reserve prices play a role only when the competition is small and [10] report that in average around 5 players takes part in a particular online auction. Since the affine class of function is larger than the linear class, we observe obviously an uplift (e.g 10% in the case of one opponent). The optimal thresholded, which has the property to get a reserve value of zero for the strategic bidder reaches an uplift of 76% against one opponent! We finally report the profit of the truthful thresholded shading function which satisfies Theorem 1 and consists in bidding truthfully after the reserve price. It has the nice property of not depending on the competition and thus is very easy to implement in practice (one gets 57 % uplift with one opponent). 
Consequences for the impact of collusion in second price auctions
In this section, we show why understanding that bidders could have an incentive to shade their bids have implications on some current debates on the optimal design of the main online advertising platforms. The payoff are computed with averaging the payoff over 100000 runs of the auction system. We notice that the thresholded equilibrium strategy gives the same profit as bidding truthfully when the seller does not set any reserve prices -the two curves cannot be distinguished on our graph as our theory predicts. We also note that the larger class of affine shading functions yields lower revenue for the bidders than the smaller class of linear shading functions. This means that trying to optimize in broad classes of functions may result in wealth destruction for the buyers as they have to "protect" themselves against other buyers with a large number of strategies at their disposal.
DSPs (Demand Side Platforms) are intermediaries in the advertising chain which predict the value of a display opportunity for their clients (brands, big e-commerce platforms..) and bid on behalf of them. The very recent work by Allouah and Besbes [1] questions the tactical role played by these DSP platforms. More formally, they compare two main settings: the independent campaign management case where each DSP would submit all the bids of its own clients and the current practice in the industry that they call coordinated campaign management where each DSP only submits the maximum bid over all its clients.
The authors of [1] proved that the coordinated schema leads to lower payoff for the advertisers. This result is based on the assumption that DSPs bid truthfully. In this section, we show that once they shade their bid as presented in the previous sections and they do not undergo the choice of reserve price, the coordinated campaign management schema leads to higher revenues for advertisers. This section should not be seen as a case for DSPs but only as an attempt to understand the tactical role they play when they submit the maximum bid over their clients.
Modeling and Notations
We model the online advertising chain as a mechanism between one seller, J intermediaries (DSPs) that are representing each K buyers. The k th advertiser of intermediary j has a value v k j . More precisely, for the DSP j, we denote the order statistics of
J . We also note by (w [1] , ..., w [J] ) the order statistic of (v
J ). We note v 1:J the vector with all the values of all the buyers.
We consider the symmetric case where all the buyers have the same value distribution F . The seller runs a second price auction with reserve price equal to the monopoly price.
We can write respectively the profit of bidders when the advertisers and DSPs are bidding truthfully respectively in the coordinated case (the DSP submits the maximum bid over the buyers he represents) and in the independent case (the DSP submits the value of all the buyers he represents). [1] − max(r truth co , w [2] ) + ]
The authors of [1] are able to compare U truth co and U truth in when F is a generalized Pareto distribution parametrized by ξ:
They consider the generalized pareto family since it is a general class of function (it contains both the uniform and the exponential distribution). It also simplifies calculation since the virtual value is linear in this class. However, according to sections 2 and 3, bidding truthfully is not the optimal strategy for bidders in second price auctions when the seller is learning the monopoly price based on their previous bids. We show why applying strategies presented in Section 3 reverses and refutes Theorem 5.
K advertisers and 1 DSP: impact of linear shading strategies
We first detail impact of linear shading strategies since this class of strategy is easy to implement. In the independent case, the seller defines the reserve price based on the virtual value of each advertiser. If we note f in the pdf of one advertiser and F in its cdf:
In the coordinated case, since the seller is receiving from each DSP the maximum of the values of K advertisers, she is defining the reserve price based on:
We note β co (x) = α co x the optimal linear shading strategy in the coordinated case and β in (x) = α in x the optimal linear shading strategy in the independent case. We recall that in the case of linear shading: ψ B (αx) = αψ(x).
In the case of only one DSP bidding for K buyers, it is clear that the DSP has an incentive to shade their bid: with zero competitor, shading does not impact the probability of winning and decreases the cost. More precisely, following the same formalism as in the previous sections and using the Myerson lemma, we can write the profit of the bidders in the different settings.
In the independent campaign management setting,
We note α * in the linear shading factor which is maximizing U in . In the coordinated campaign management setting,
K Theorem 6 (Coordinated campaign management dominates independent campaign management with K buyers and one DSP). We assume that the value distribution for each advertiser is a uniform U[0, 1]. For all K ∈ N there exists K such that for all 0 ≤ α co ≤ K ,
Sketch of proof : We use the fact that linear shading do not change the reserve value. We can compute analytically the reserve price without shading. We can compute the optimal linear shading in the independent case and compute the revenue of each bidder in this case. For the coordinated case, we can compute the revenue of the bidders when the DSP is always bidding zero and show that this revenue is strictly higher than in the independent case. By continuity of the revenue function of the shading factor, we show the theorem.
The formal proof is provided in the appendix. In Figure. 3, we show empirically this impact of linear shading on the broad family of generalized Pareto distributions. The coefficient of variation helps to interpolate between all the distributions in this family. The uniform distribution correspond to a coefficient of variation equal to 1/ √ 2. The left figure is the one presented in [1] . Fig. 3 . Case of 2 bidders and one DSP, linear shading. Payoff of the two bidders, of the seller and total wellfare function of the coefficient of variation when the bidders and the DSP are bidding truthfully (left) and when the DSP is using the optimal linear shading function (right) function of the coefficient of variation. The conclusions of [1] are upended and the results reversed.
K advertisers and L DSPs: impact of thresholded strategies
We also show that our result holds when we increase the number of advertisers and the number of sellers. It holds with the linear shading strategy (see Appendix). Here we detail results when advertisers and DSPs are using the thresholded strategy presented in Section 3.
Theorem 7 (Coordinated campaign management dominates independent campaign management with L DSPs K buyers per DSP). We assume all advertisers are symmetric and have the same distribution F. We assume L DSPs and K buyers per DSP. We assume all bidders are using the strategy of Theorem 3. For all K ∈ N, for all L ∈ N,
Proof. We reuse the result of Section 3. The revenue of bidders using the optimal thresholded strategy at symmetric equilibrium is the revenue they would get when the seller set the reserve price to zero. Thus we only need to compare the revenue of the two settings when the reserve price is equal to zero. Detailed proof in the appendix.
In Figure 4 , we present a numerical experiment in the case of 4 advertisers and 2 DSPs. 6 How can we implement these strategies in practice?
We now turn to some robustness questions, motivated by the fact that the seller needs to estimate the distribution of the buyer and hence does not have perfect knowledge of F . Hence, the buyer needs to find a robust shading method, making sure that the seller has an incentive to lower her reserve prices, even if she misestimates the value distribution of the buyer.
We call ψ F the virtual value function associated with the distribution F , i.e. ψ F (
Lemma 4. Suppose that the buyer uses a shading strategy β under her value distribution F . Suppose the seller thinks that the value distribution of the buyer is G. Call λ F and λ G the hazard rate functions of the two distributions Then the seller computes the virtual value function of the buyer under G, denoted ψ B,G , as
As an aside, we note that almost by definition we have 1
We have the following useful corollary pertaining to the thresholded strategies described in Section 3. Corollary 1. If the buyer uses the strategy β r, defined as
we have, for x = r, ψ B,F (β r, (x)) = 1 [x≤r] + ψ F (x)1 [x>r] .
In particular, we have for x = r
Hence, if for all x ψ B,F (β r, (x)) ≥ , and |ψ
The lemma and corollary show that a natural way to quantify the proximity of distributions in this context is of course in terms of their virtual value functions. Furthermore, if the buyer uses a shading function such that under her strategy and value distribution the perceived virtual value is positive, as long as the seller computes the virtual value using a nearby distribution, she will also perceive a positive virtual value and hence have no incentive to put a reserve price above the lowest bid. In particular, if δ comes from an approximation error that the buyer can predict or measure, she can also adjust her so as to make sure that the seller perceives a positive virtual value for all x. We pursue this specific question in more details in the next subsection.
The case of empirical risk minimization (ERM)
The previous results already give some results about the impact of empirically estimating the value distribution F by the empirical cumulative distribution functionF n on setting the reserve price. However because our approximations are formulated in terms of hazard rate, applying those results would yield quite poor approximation results in the context of setting the monopoly price through ERM. This is due to the fact that estimating a density pointwise in supremum norm is a somewhat difficult problem in general, associated with poor rates of convergence. We refer the interested reader to [22] for more details on this question. So we now focus on the specific problem of empirical minimization and take advantage of its characteristics to obtain better results than would have been possible by applying the results of the previous section naively.
Theorem 8. Suppose the buyer has a continuous and increasing value distribution
Suppose the buyer uses the shading strategy β r, described above and samples n values {x i } n i=1 i.i.d according to the distribution F and bids accordingly in second price auctions. Call x (n) = max 1≤i≤n x i . In this case the (population) reserve value x * is equal to 0. Assume that the seller uses empirical risk minimization to determine the monopoly price in a (lazy) second price auction, using these n samples.
Callx * n the reserve value determined by the seller using ERM. We have, if C n (δ) = n −1/2 log(2/δ)/2 and > x (n) C n (δ)/F (r) with probability at least 1 − δ 1 ,
In particular, if is replaced by a sequence n such that n 1/2 n min(1, 1/x (n) ) → ∞ in probability, x * n goes to 0 in probability like n −1/2 max(1, x (n) )/ n .
Informally speaking, our theorem says that using the strategy sβ r, n with n slightly larger n −1/2 will yield a reserve value arbitrarily close to 0. Hence the population results we derived in earlier sections to the sample version of the problem. Examples : Our theorem applies for value distributions that are bounded with n of order n −1/2+η , η > 0 and fixed. If the value distribution is log-normal(µ, σ) truncated away from 0 so all values are greater than a very small threshold t, standard results on the maximum of i.i.d N (µ, σ) random variables guarantee that x (n) ≤ exp(µ + σ 2 log(n)) with probability going to 1. In that case too, picking n of order n −1/2+η , η > 0 and fixed, guarantees that the reserve value computed by the seller by ERM will converge to the population reserve value, which is of course 0. Comment : The requirement on γ F , which essentially means that the density f is bounded away from 0 could also be weakened with more technical work to make this requirement hold only around 0, at least for the convergence in probability result. Similarly one could handle situations, like the log-normal case, where γ F is close to 0 at 0 by refining slightly the first part of the argument given in the proof. As these are minor technical issues we do not investigate them any further.
Conclusion
We have shown in this paper that revenue optimization on the seller side turns a number of classical auction formats that are widely purported to be truthful into auctions that are not incentive compatible. This is especially relevant in the context of repeated auctions and Internet advertising.
We proposed several constructive shading strategies bidders could use to improve their payoffs. Bidders' shading strategies can be as simple as linearly shading bids. The tools we develop in the paper also allow us to propose non-linear shading strategies that amount to thresholding the virtual value. The results apply both when only one buyer is strategic and in symmetric equilibrium situations.
Most of the paper is focused on the lazy second price auction, with reserve price set at the monopoly price. We find an equilibrium strategy (in a broad and natural class of shading functions) resulting in the same revenue for buyers as in a second price auction with no reserve price. We can also use these ideas to considerably increase the revenue of the buyer in a one strategic setting, while not diminishing the revenue of the seller. As such reserve prices, appear in our context to mostly destroy welfare while not bringing more revenue to the seller. Finally, we show that using the new strategies we propose upends some recent results based on classical strategies that claimed that coordinated campaign management or collusion resulted in lower payoffs for the buyers.
This body of work suggests that, counter-intuitively, adopting revenue-optimizing auctions may not bring more revenue to the seller. It does however turn otherwise simple means of exchange of goods into quite opaque ones and may destroy welfare.
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Appendix
Reminders
We recall the formula for both the buyer and the seller revenues in second price auction. We also refer the reader to Equation (5.9) in [13] for details of similar computations. We however re-derive the lemma below because it is of crucial importance to our paper. Lemma 5. Suppose bidder i has values X i with distribution F and associated density f . f is assumed to be positive on the support of X i . Call, for an increasing function β,
f (x) . Suppose that bidder i bids according to B i = β(X i ) For 2nd price auctions, when β is an increasing function, and G represents the distribution of the bids faced by user i, we have, if t is the reserve price set by the seller,
regardless of whether ψ Bi is increasing/L(B i ) is regular.
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of [5] reproduced in [13] , so we do not spell it out. It consists in using Fubini's theorem and integration by parts to transform the standard form of the seller revenue, i.e.
into the above equation.
It suffices to work with along the lines mentioned above with Y i = max j =i B j and realize that i'th expected payment can be written as
Proof of results of Section 2
Proofs of ODE lemmas We start by proving Lemma 1.
Proof (Proof of Lemma 1). If B = γ(X 1 ), F B (x) = P (B ≤ x) = P (γ(X 1 ) ≤ x) = F 1 (γ −1 (x)), since γ is increasing. Hence, for the density of B, we have
Therefore, (1). For the second part of the lemma, we recall that ψ 1 (x 1 ) = (1 − F 1 (x 1 ))/f 1 (x 1 ) (see [13] , Chap. 5, p. 68). Hence, for any function η, we have, when f 1 (x 1 ) > 0,
This proves Equation
It is now easy to verify by direct computation that if
Perturbation analysis for second price auctions
Proof (Proof of Lemma 2). It is easy to see that h β+tρ = h β + th ρ and hence
We call x β the reserve value, which we assume satisfies h β (x β ) = 0. So we get,
Hence, rewriting the expectation as an integral, we get
Of course this integral can be written as
Rearranging everything we finally find that
Proof of results of Section 3
Proof (Proof of Theorem 1). The reserve value r > 0 is given. Consider
To make things simple we require t r (r) = β r (r + ), so we have continuity. Note that beyond r the seller revenue is unaffected. If the seller sets the reserve value at r 0 the extra benefit compared to setting it at r is E ψ tr (t r (X)G(t r (X))1 [r0≤X<r] .
Hence, as long as ψ tr (x) ≥ 0, the seller has an incentive to lower the reserve value. The extra gain to the buyer is E (X − ψ tr (t r (X)))G(t r (X))1 [r0≤X<r] .
Now, if we take
it is easy to verify that
So in this limit case, there is no extra cost to the buyer and the reserve price can be moved by the seller to any value on [0, r] without loss. If we assume that the seller is welfare benevolent, s/he will set the reserve value to 0. To have continuity, we just require that
Since there is no extra cost for the buyer, it is clear that his/her payoff is increased with this strategy. Taking t
gives a strict incentive to the seller to move the reserve value to 0, (so the assumption that s/he is welfare benevolent is not required) even if it is slightly suboptimal for the buyer. Note that we explained in Lemma 1 how to construct such a ψ. In particular,
works. Taking limits proves the result, i.e. for small enough the Lemma holds, since everything is continuous in .
Comment We note that the flexibility afforded by is two-fold: when > 0, the extra seller revenue is a strictly decreasing function of the reserve price; hence even if for some reason reserve price movements are required to be small, the seller will have an incentive to make such move. The other reason is more related to estimation issues: if the reserve price is determined by empirical risk minimization, and hence affected by even small sampling noise, having big enough will guarantee that the mean extra gain of the seller will be above this sampling noise. Of course, the average cost for the bidder is just at each value under the current reserve price and hence may not be a too hefty price to bear. Lemma 6. In lazy second price auctions, when looking for the optimal shading function, we can focus on β's such that β * = argmax β∈F0 Π(β) ,
where F 0 = {β : reserve value = 0}. This is true both in the multi-player equilibrium and one strategic player setting.
Proof. Let F r = {β : reserve value = r}. We showed above in Lemma 6 that given β r in F r we can findβ r ∈ F 0 with better performance than β r which proves the result.
We now state a directional derivative result in the class of strategies described above. It implies that the only strategies with 0 "gradient" in this class are strategies that are truthful beyond a value r, where r can be determined through a simple non-linear equation.
Lemma 7. Suppose r and β are given and such that ψ B (β(r)) > 0. Call R(β; r) the revenue of the bidder using the strategy
Consequences and Technical results concerning Lemma 3
Symmetric case We recall from previous results in the paper that in this case
Equations (6) and (5) Proof. We have by integration by parts
Hence finding the root of
amounts to finding the root(s) of
0 is an obvious root of the above equation but does not work for the penultimate one... Note that for regular distributions, this function R is decreasing and then increasing after ψ −1 X (0), since the virtual value is negative and then positive. Since R(0) = 0, it will have at most one non-zero root for regular distributions. The fact that this function is positive at infinity (or at the end of the support of X) comes from the fact that its value then is the revenue-per-buyer of a seller performing a second price auction with K symmetric buyers bidding truthfully with a reserve price of 0. And this is by definition positive. So we have shown that for regular distributions the function R has exactly one non-zero root. This result implies the following Theorem.
Theorem 9. Suppose we are in a symmetric situation and all buyers use the symmetric optimal strategy described above.
Proof (Proof of Lemma 9) . We use again integration by parts :
So we are really looking at the properties of the solution of
We call
For regular distributions, it is clear that if r = ψ −1 (0), I(r) < 0. Now we note that
Using
So if r is a solution of
we have, if r > ψ −1 X (0) and r = 1, ∂I(r) ∂r > 0 .
So r needs to be a solution of I(r) = 0 (which is equivalent to the initial equation for non-trivial solutions) and must have ∂I(r) ∂r > 0. So we have shown that I is a function such that its (non-trivial) zeros are such that I is strictly increasing at those roots. Because I is differentiable and hence continuous, this implies that I can have at most one non-trivial root. (0 is a trivial root of I(r) = 0, though it is not an acceptable solution of our initial problem.)
We note that the end point of the support of X is also a trivial solution of I(r) = 0, by the dominated convergence theorem, though not an acceptable solution of our initial problem, as shown by a simple inspection. 
has a unique root in (0, 1).
In particular in this situation there exists an optimal strategy in the class of shading functions defined in Lemma 3 and it is unique. It is defined by being truthful beyond r * : G(r * ) = 0 and shading in such a way that our virtual value is 0 below r * .
Proof. We have already seen that this equation has at most one zero on (0,1) so we now just need to show that the function G is positive somewhere to have established that it has a zero. Of course, for r = ψ −1 (0), the function is negative.
• G not locally constant near 0 Since G is a cdf, and hence a non-decreasing function, the first k such that g (k) (0) = 0 has g (k) (0) > 0. Otherwise, G would be decreasing around 0. We treat the case where G is constant near 0 later so we now assume that k exists and is finite.
Let r be such that 1 − F (r) = very small (e.g. 10 −6 ). Let c < r be such that (1 − F (r))/(1 − F (c)) < η very small (e.g. 10 −3 ) and ψ X (c) > 0. Hence we can use a Taylor approximation to get that
Integrating this out (ignoring at this point possible integration questions), we get [X≤c] .
Now integration by parts shows that
If k = 1, using the fact that (log(1 − F (x)) = −f (x)/(1 − F (x)), we have
We now assume that k > 1; the adjustments for k = 1 are trivial and are left to the reader. Clearly, when F (c) is close to 1, we have, since we assume that f (c) = 0,
So we have, as c increases so that F (c) 1 (while of course having (1 − F (r))/(1 − F (c)) < η),
Now we note that using a Taylor expansion of 1 − F (x) around r, we have
So we see that
If now we take c 2 such that 1 − F (r)/(1 − F (c 2 )) = 1/3, the reasoning above applies and we have
Of course the choice of 1/3 above is arbitrary and it could be replaced by any fixed number s < 1 such that G(sr) > 0. We conclude that G is positive in a neighborhood of 1.
• G locally constant near 0 In this case we can pick c such that
If c is such that ψ(c) > 0 our arguments above immediately carry through. In fact we can ensure that this is always true by picking such a c and picking a corresponding r as function of the ratio (1 − F (r))/(1 − F (c)) we would like. So we conclude that even in this case, G is positive in a neighborhood of 1 Theorem 10. We consider the symmetric case and assume that bidders have a compactly supported and regular distribution. We assume for simplicity that the distribution is supported on [0,1]. Suppose this distribution has density that is continuous at 0 and 1 with f (1) = 0. Then there is a unique symmetric equilibrium in the class of shading functions defined in Lemma 3.
It is found by solving Equation (6) to determine r * and bidding truthfully beyond r * .
Proof. We already know that there is at most one solution since Equation (6) has exactly one solution.
If all the bidders but one put themselves at this strategy, we know from Lemma 10, which applies because of our assumptions on f , that the optimal strategy for bidder one is unique in the class we consider and consists in using a shading that is truthful beyond r. This r is uniquely determined by Equation (5) but given the shading used by the other players we know that the r determined by Equation (6) is a solution. Hence we have an equilibrium.
Uniform[0,1] example When K = 2, the solution of Equation (6) and hence the equilibrium is obtained at r = 3/4. For K = 3, r = 2/3; K = 4 gives r = 15/24 = 0.625; K = 5 gives r = .6. These are the values we used in Figure 2 . 9.5 Proof of results of Section 5 K advertisers, 1 DSP, uniform distribution, linear shading Theorem 11 (Coordinated campaign management dominates independent campaign management). We assume that the value distribution for each advertiser is a uniform U[0, 1]. For all K ∈ N there exists K such that for all 0 ≤ α co ≤ K ,
Proof (Proof of Theorem 6). With the assumptions:
With the equations from the first part,
We used 1 − 2α * in ≤ 0 for all K. We can also compute the revenue in the coordinated case.
We reach that U co (K, 1, 0) ≥ U in (K, 1, α * in ).
K advertisers L DSPs, uniform distribution, thresholded shading Theorem 12 (Coordinated campaign management dominates independent campaign management with L DSPs K buyers per DSPs ). We assume that the value distribution for each advertiser is a uniform U[0, 1]. For all K ∈ N,
Proof. We reuse the result of Section 3. The revenue of bidders using the optimal thresholded strategy at symmetric equilibrium is the revenue they would get when the seller set the reserve price to zero. Thus we only need to compare the revenue of the two settings when the reserve price is equal to zero. In this case,
In the case of uniform distribution, we have clearly : U thrsh in (K, L) ≤ U thrsh co (K, L) K advertisers, L DSPs, threshholded shading Proof (Proof of Theorem 7) . n this case, Proof. As we have seen before we have
By construction, we have
If the seller perceives the behavior of the buyer under the distribution G, we have ψ B,G (β(x)) = β(x) − β (x) 1 − G(x) g(x) .
Hence, we have
Recall the hazard function λ F (x) = f (x)/(1 − F (x)). With this notation, we simply have
The corollary follows by noting that when x ≤ r,
Proof of Theorem 8
Proof. • Preliminaries Notations : We use the standard notation for order statistics b (1) ≤ b (2) ≤ . . . ≤ b (n) to denote our n increasingly ordered bids. We denote as usual byF n the empirical cumulative distribution function obtained from a sample of n i.i.d observations drawn from a population distribution F . Setting the monopoly price by ERM amounts to finding, ifB n is the empirical cdf of the bids, b * n = argmax t t(1 −B n (t))
We note in particular than b * n ≤ max
since (1 −B n (t)) = 0 for t > b (n) . Because (1 −B n (t)) is piecewise constant and the function t → t is increasing, on [b (i) , b (i+1) ) the function t(1 −B n (t)) reaches its supremum at b − (i+1) . b * n = argmax t t(1 −B n (t)) = argmax
Since our shading function β r, is increasing and if x (i) are our ordered values, we have, ifF n is the empirical cdf of our value distribution,
The last equality comes again from the fact that (1 −F n (u)) is piecewise constant and β r, (u) is increasing. So in our analysis we can act as if the seller had perfect information of our shading function β r, .
In what follows we focus on reserve values and denotê
x * r,n = argmax 0≤x≤r β r, (x)(1 −F n (x)) ,x * n = argmax 0≤x β r, (x)(1 −F n (x)) ,
x * = argmax β r, (x)(1 − F (x))
The arguments we gave above imply thatx * r,n ≤ x (n) . We will otherwise study the continuous version of the problem. We also note that by construction, x * = 0, though we keep it in the proof as it makes it clearer.
We recall one main result of [23] on the Dvoretzky-Kiefer-Wolfowitz (DKW) inequality: if C n (δ) = n −1/2 log(2/δ)/2,
In what follows, we therefore assume that we have a uniform approximation ∀x , |F n (x) − F (x)| ≤ C n (δ) , since it holds with probability 1 − δ. In what follows we write C n instead of C n (δ) for the sake of clarity. Using the fact that β r, is increasing, this immediately implies that with probability at least 1 − δ, for any c > 0 ∀x ∈ [0, c] , |β r, (x)(1 −F n (x)) − β r, (x)(1 − F (x))| ≤ β r, (c)C n .
•x * r,n = argmax y≤r β r, (y)(1 −F n (y)) cannot be too far from x * Now for our construction of β r, (x), we have by construction that
In particular, it means that when x, y ≤ r β r, (x)(1 − F (x)) − β r, (y)(1 − F (y)) = − (F (x) − F (y)) .
Also x * = 0 since β r, (1 − F ) is decreasing on [0, r], as we have just seen that its derivative is negative. Here we used the fact that F is increasing. If r > y ≥ x * + tC n / , we have, using the previous inequality and the fact that β r, (1 − F ) is decreasing on [0, r], β r, (y)(1 − F (y)) ≤ β r, (x * )(1 − F (x * )) − (F (x * + tC n / ) − F (x * )) .
Since we assumed that F (x 2 ) − F (x 1 ) ≥ γ F (x 2 − x 1 ), we have − (F (x * + tC n / ) − F (x * )) ≤ −tC n γ F .
Since β r, is increasing, we have sup 0≤x≤r β r, (x) ≤ β r, (r) = r. Picking t > 2r/γ F , it is clear that for r > y ≥ x + tC n / , max r≥u≥x+tCn/ β r, (u)(1 −F n (u)) ≤ max r≥u≥x+tCn/ β r, (u)(1 − F (u)) + max r≥u≥x+tCn/ β r, (u)C n ≤ β r, (x * )(1 − F (x * )) + (r − tγ F )C n < β r, (x * )(1 − F (x * )) − rC n ≤ β r, (x * )(1 −F n (x * )) .
We conclude thatx * r,n cannot be greater than x + 2rC n /( γ F ) and thereforê
x * r,n −x < 2rC n γ F .
• Dealing with max y>r β r, (y)(1 −F n (y)) Recall that max x β r, (x)(1 − F (x)) = β r, (0)(1 − F (0)) = r(1 − F (r)) + F (r). We now assume that max y≥r y(1 − F (y)) = r(1 − F (r)). This is in particular the case for regular distributions, which are commonly assumed in auction theory.
To show that the argmax cannot be in [r, b] with pre-specified probability we simply show that the estimated value of the seller revenue at reserve value 0 is higher than max y>r β r, (y)(1 −F n (y)). Of course, max y>r β r, (y)(1 −F n (y)) = max x (n) ≥y>r β r, (y)(1 −F n (y)) .
Recall that β r, (0) = r(1 − F (r)) + F (r). Under our assumptions, we have β r, (0)(1 −F n (0)) = β r, (0) = r(1 − F (r)) + F (r) and max x (n) ≥y≥r β r, (y)(1 −F n (y))
≤ max
x (n) ≥y≥r β r, (y)(1 − F (y)) + C n max x (n) ≥y≥r β r, (y) ≤ r(1 − F (r)) + C n x (n)
So as long as > x (n) C n /F (r), the result we seek holds. By assumption this property holds with probability 1 − δ 1 . The statement of the theorem holds when both parts of the proof hold. Since they hold with probability at least 1 − δ and 1 − δ 1 the intersection event holds with probability at least 1 − δ − δ 1 , as announced.
• Asymptotic statement/Convergence in probability issue This is a straightforward application of the previous result and we give no further details.
